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Abstract
We develop a continuous-time general-equilibrium model to rationalize the dynamics of insur-
ance prices in a competitive insurance market with ﬁnancial frictions. Insurance companies choose
underwriting and ﬁnancing policies to maximize shareholder value. The equilibrium price dynamics
is explicit, which allows simple numerical simulations and generates testable implications. In partic-
ular, we ﬁnd that the equilibrium price of insurance is (weakly) predictable and the insurance sector
always realizes positive expected proﬁts. Moreover, rather than true cycles, insurance prices exhibit
asymmetric reversals caused by the reﬂection of the aggregate capacity process at the dividend and
recapitalization boundaries.
1. Introduction
The phenomenon of underwriting cycles appears to be a prominent feature of the insurance
industry. Insurance premiums and proﬁts rise (in hard markets phases) and fall (in soft markets
phases) with some regularity over time. In soft markets, prices and proﬁts are low and insurance
capacity is high, whereas, in hard markets, prices and proﬁts are high, insurance capacity is restricted
and policy cancellations or non renewals are frequent. Hard markets can appear very suddenly and
they are often referred to as liability crises as, for instance, between 1984 and 1986 when premium
revenues nearly tripled before slowly decreasing in the next decade.
Meier (2006) studies the existence of such underwriting cycles in property-liability insurance
for Switzerland, the USA, Japan and West Germany over a period of 40 years (1957-1997). Using
autoregressive models of order 2, she ﬁnds cycles for the US, West German and Swiss markets,
whereas most speciﬁcations for Japan do not reveal cycles. In the same way, Meier and Outreville
(2006) show empirical evidence of an underwriting cycle in property-liability insurance for France,
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Germany and Switzerland and for the European reinsurance industry between 1982 and 2001.
However, a more recent study by Boyer, Jacquier and Van Norden (2012) casts doubt on the reality
of AR(2) cycles. Their argument is that standard estimation techniques overstate the likelihood of
having a cycle because of the non linearity of the link between AR(2) parameters and the value
of the period. They conclude that the observed underwriting ﬂuctuations cannot be considered as
truly cyclical.
From a theoretical perspective, it is hard to explain cycles by the conventional view according
to which insurance premiums should be informationally eﬃcient predictors of the present value of
policy claims and expenses. For such arbitrage oriented theories, underwriting cycles come largely
from institutional lags and reporting practices. In some sense, they are artefacts essentially due
to accounting rules, informational delays or regulatory rigidities (see e.g., Cummins and Outreville
(1987), Lamm-Tennant and Weiss (1997) or Chen, Wong and Lee (1999)).
By contrast, capacity constraint theories suggest that real frictions on capital markets can be the
cause of underwriting cycles by making the industry's capacity temporarily dependent on short-term
proﬁts and losses. According to this approach, a cycle begins when insurers dramatically reduce
capacity after large losses that have depleted their reserves. After some time, reserves are restored
and capacity increases again. But the increase in underwriting capacity increases competition,
which, in turn, drives premiums down. When insurers incur a reduction in capital due to unexpected
losses, they are reluctant to issue new equity due to high issuance costs. This implies that shocks
to insurers' capital aﬀect the price and quantity of insurance supplied in the short run. In such a
context, prices are not really periodic but only reﬂect past losses. From that point of view, a cycle
is a time lapse to recover capacity.
In this paper we propose a fully ﬂedged dynamic model that reconciles arbitrage oriented and
capacity constraint theories. In our model, insurers are value-maximizers and competitive. However,
they face a ﬁnance market with frictions, in that issuing new equity is costly.1 The industry capacity
(aggregate liquid reserves) determines the dynamics of dividends, recapitalizations and premiums.
Insurance companies distribute dividends when the sector capacity is high and the expected proﬁts
are low. Symmetrically, recapitalizations take place when capacity becomes too small. The reﬂection
property of the capacity process at two boundaries causes oscillations that lead to a quasi-cyclical
pattern. The equilibrium price of insurance is a decreasing function of the industry capacity and
its maximum level is increasing with the magnitude of the ﬁnancial frictions.
An interesting prediction generated by our model is that underwriting "cycles" will in general
be asymmetric. We measure the average duration of the soft market phase by the expected time it
takes for the price of insurance to reach its minimum level while starting at its maximum level. In
1The notion that external equity ﬁnancing is more costly than ﬁnancing via retained earnings is discussed e.g. in
Winter (1994). On the empirical side, Gron and Lucas (1998) ﬁnd evidence of the important costs of raising external
capital for the property-casualty insurers.
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a similar fashion, the average duration of the hard market phase is approximated by the expected
time it takes for the price of insurance to recover from its minimum level up to its maximum level.
Consistent with empirical evidence reported in Figure 1, our numerical analysis shows that the soft
market phase lasts longer (in expectation) than the hard market phase. Moreover, this diﬀerence
turns out to be more pronounced when the elasticity of the demand for insurance is high.
Figure 1: Insurance price index
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Notes: this ﬁgure reports the pattern of the insurance price index (data from The Council of Insurance Agents and Brokers
2013, base 100:1999), showing evidence that the soft market phase (declining prices) lasts longer than the hard market phase
(rising prices).
Our paper is related to the earlier literature that attempts to link the emergence of cycles to
changes in insurers' net worth. Stewart (1984) and Bloom (1987) have developed two simple models
along this line. They rely on a partial equilibrium approach where the shifts of insurance supply
curves explain the underwriting cycle. The position of the supply curve is aﬀected by insurers' net
worth and the form of insurer expectations explains the timing and length of the high-price phase.
Cagle and Harrington (1995) propose a model of insurance supply with capacity constraints and
endogenous default risk. If industry demand is inelastic with respect to price and capital, the price
will increase following a negative shock to capital. Choi, Hardigree and Thistle (2002) perform an
empirical comparison of six alternative models of insurance pricing using data between 1935 and
1997. They ﬁnd that the capacity constraint model is consistent with data, both in the long and
short term. Gron (1994) also provides empirical support for the primary predictions of capacity
constraint theories of property-casualty insurance cycles.
The closest related paper is Winter (1994) who develops a discrete time model similar to ours.
Namely, in Winter (1994) insurers accumulate equity capital so as to rule out default and to be able
to meet policyholders' claims. This feature implies an upward-sloping short-run supply curve whose
position is determined by the level of capital. On top of this, a cost diﬀerential between internal and
external sources of capital prevents ﬁnancial capital from quickly adjusting. The insured individual
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risk is the loss of one dollar with a probability that is common to all insurees but which is itself
random. As in our model, the state variable is the total net wealth of the insurance companies and
the (rational expectation) equilibrium is characterized by the joint dynamics of insurance prices and
market-to-book (Tobin's q) ratio. However, in contrast to our model, the recursive characterization
of the equilibrium dynamics in Winter (1994) does not allow explicit solutions. Winter shows,
through simulation methods, that the equilibrium price is larger than the expected loss and is
negatively correlated with capacity.
Our model can be seen as a continuous time version of Winter (1994). While generating the main
predictions consistent with those obtained in discrete time, it allows the explicit characterization
of equilibrium dynamics. We illustrate the advantage of using the continuous-time approach by
analysing the cyclical properties of price ﬂuctuations.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 charac-
terizes the competitive equilibrium. Section 4 studies the dynamics of insurance prices. Section 5
concludes.
2. The Model
We consider a competitive insurance market that consists of a continuum of insurance companies
oﬀering insurance to individuals who face perfectly correlated risks2 (such as weather risks). All
agents discount the future at a constant rate r. The cumulative loss Lt incurred by each individual
up to date t is such that
dLt = `dt+ σ0dBt,
where ` denotes expected losses per unit of time, σ0 is an exposure parameter and Bt is a standard
Brownian motion deﬁned on the probability space
(
Ω,F,P
)
that generates the ﬁltration F =
{Ft, t ≥
0
}
. We assume that Bt is the same for all individuals (perfect correlation between risks).
Insurance contracts are short-term and the market price of insurance per unit of time is
pit = `+ σ0pt,
where pt is a (rescaled) loading factor. For simplicity, throughout the paper we refer to pt as to the
price of insurance. The demand for insurance is exogenously given by a function D(p), such that
D′(.) < 0.
Since insurance contracts have an inﬁnitesimal length, insurers have no long-term liabilities.
Thus, the balance sheet of each insurance company has only one item on each side: equity et on the
liability side and liquid reserves on the asset side with et = mt. Therefore, mt (Mt on aggregate)
can be viewed simultaneously as the volume of individual (respectively, aggregate) reserves or as
2The idiosyncratic part of individual risk is neglected, since it can be eliminated by diversiﬁcation.
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the book value of equity for an insurance company (respectively, the entire insurance industry). In
an inﬁnitesimal period (t, t + dt), an individual insurer operating at a scale xt generates earnings
xt(pitdt− dLt) that can be distributed as dividends or can be retained in reserves. Moreover, insur-
ance companies can increase the level of reserves by raising new equity, which entails a proportional
cost γ.3
The dynamics of reserves mt of an insurance company operating at scale xt at time t is given
by4
dmt = σ0xt (ptdt− dBt) + dit − dδt, (1)
where dδt ≥ 0 and dit ≥ 0 denote, respectively, the changes in the cumulative dividend and recapi-
talization amounts. In fact, our model can be viewed as a general equilibrium version of the classical
ruin theory model (in its Brownian version, as in Gerber-Shiu (2004)), where reserves' dynamics is
given by
dmt = µdt− σ0dBt − dδt.
The main diﬀerence, however, pertains to the fact that, in our setting, prices and quantities are
endogenous, and insurance companies have the possibility to recapitalize.
Provided that, at equilibrium, the supply of insurance contracts equals the demand, the dynamics
of aggregate reserves (capacity) of the entire insurance sector satisfy
dMt = σ0D(pt) (ptdt− dBt) + dIt − d∆t, (2)
where d∆t ≥ 0 and dIt ≥ 0 denote, respectively, the changes in the aggregate cumulative dividend
and recapitalization amounts.
In our model, we focus on a Markovian stationary equilibrium, in which the insurance price is a
deterministic function of the aggregate level of reserves in the insurance sector, i.e., pt = p(Mt). To
formally deﬁne the equilibrium, let J = [0, 1] denote the set of insurance companies, each of which
is indexed by j ∈ J.
Deﬁnition 1. A stationary Markovian competitive equilibrium consists of an aggregate reserves pro-
cess Mt, a price of insurance p(M) and insurance supply functions x
j(M), j ∈ J, that are compatible
with insurer's proﬁt maximization and the market clearing condition
∫
J x
j(M)dj = D[p(M)].
In the following section we establish the existence of a unique stationary Markovian equilibrium
and study its main properties.
3According to Gron and Lucas (1998), for example, the direct costs of equity issues range from 1 to 5 % of the
value issued.
4We assume that reserves earn no interest.
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3. Equilibrium
Each insurance company takes the price of insurance p(Mt) and the dynamics of Mt as given
and chooses the scale of operation xt ≥ 0, dividend dδt ≥ 0 and recapitalization dit ≥ 0 policies so
as to maximize shareholder value:
v(m,M) = max
xt≥0,dδt≥0,dit≥0
E
[ ∫ +∞
0
e−rt {dδt − (1 + γ) dit}
]
,
where mt follows (1) and Mt follows (2).
Note that the objective function and the state equation (1) are homogeneous in (m,x, dδ, di)
implying that the value function is linear in the individual level of reserves, i.e.,
v(m,M) = mu(M),
where u(M) is the market-to-book value of the insurance company, which is the same for the entire
insurance sector.5
Given the above property of the value function, one can easily show that the Bellman equation
corresponding to shareholder maximization can be written as follows:
ru(M) = max
x≥0,dδ≥0,di≥0
[
xσ0
{
p(M)u(M) + σ0D[p(M)]u
′(M)
}
+ σ0D(p)p(M)u
′(M) +
σ20D
2[p(M)]
2
u′′(M)
+
dδ
m
{
1− u(M)
}
− di
m
{
1 + γ − u(M)
}]
,
(3)
where the term in the left-hand side is the expected return from holding one unit of equity in the
insurance company, the ﬁrst term in the right-hand side (in curly brackets) captures the impact of
individual risk exposure, the second and the third terms in the right-hand side reﬂect the impact
caused by the changes in the aggregate capacity of the insurance sector and the last two terms
capture, respectively, the impact of the payout and recapitalization policies.
Consider ﬁrst the optimal dividend and recapitalization policies. Maximizing with respect to
dδ ≥ 0 and di ≥ 0 implies strong conditions on u(.):
u(M) ≥ 1,
5Note that u (M) can be interpreted as the market value of one dollar of net worth (book value) in the insurance
sector when total capacity is M . It represents the insurance analogue of Tobin's q ratio, as in Winter (1994).
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with dδ > 0 only when u(M) = 1, and
u(M) ≤ 1 + γ,
with di > 0 only when u(M) = 1 + γ.
As we show below, the market-to-book ratio of the insurance sector is a decreasing function of
its aggregate capacity, i.e., u′(M) < 0. This implies that aggregate capacity M varies between two
(reﬂecting) boundaries and, as in many diﬀusion models dealing with the optimal liquidity man-
agement,6 the optimal dividend and recapitalization policies in our model are of a so-called barrier
type. In particular, dividends are distributed when the insurance sector is suﬃciently capitalized so
that aggregate reserves reach a critical level M such that the market-to-book value of the insurer's
equity falls to 1, i.e.,
u(M) = 1. (4)
By contrast, recapitalizations take place when the insurance sector is undercapitalized and re-
serves fall to a critical level M < M such that the marginal value of holding one share in the
insurance company equals the marginal cost of issuing a new share, i.e.,
u(M) = 1 + γ. (5)
We turn now to the optimal choice of the scale of operation of an insurer. Maximization with
respect to xt implies that an interior solution exists if and only if the market-to-book value u(M)
and the price p(M) satisfy:
p(M) = −u
′(M)
u(M)
σ0D[p(M)]. (6)
Under the above equality, the term in x vanishes from the Bellman equation (3) and, on the inter-
val (M,M) where aggregate capacity evolves solely due to retained earnings, the latter transforms
to
ru(M) = σ0D(p)p(M)u
′(M) +
σ20D
2[p(M)]
2
u′′(M), M ∈ (M,M).
Dividing the above equation by u(M) and using Equation (6) to replace the term u
′(M)
u(M) , one
obtains:
r + p2(M) =
σ20D
2[p(M)]
2
u′′(M)
u(M)
. (7)
As long as the price of insurance p(M) satisﬁes Equations (6) - (7), the shareholders of an
insurance company are indiﬀerent with respect to their scale of operation. The size of the insurance
6See e.g., Jeanblanc and Shiryaev (1995), Rochet and Villeneuve (2011), Bolton, Chen and Wang (2011). In
the context of actuarial models, various applications of the optimal liquidity management are discussed in Schmidli
(2008).
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sector will therefore be entirely determined by the demand side.
Fundamentally, Equations (6) - (7) stem from the absence of arbitrage opportunities and per-
fect competition in the insurance market. To see this, we resort to the non-arbitrage arguments.
Consider the total market value (total capitalization) of the insurance sector at time t:
Wt ≡ u (Mt)Mt.
The arbitrage free condition implies
E [dWt] = rWtdt,
or, equivalently,
E [u (Mt + dMt)Mt] + E [u (Mt + dMt) dMt]− u (Mt)Mt = ru (Mt)Mtdt. (8)
Given the law of motion of Mt, the second term in the above equation can be rewritten as
follows:
E[u (Mt + dMt) dMt] =
{
u (Mt) p (Mt) dt− E
[
u (Mt + dMt) dBt
]}
σ0D [p(Mt)] ,
where the term in the right-hand side is the expected market value of the proﬁt margin generated
by insurance activity. Perfect competition on the insurance market implies that this market value
is zero, i.e.,
u (Mt) p (Mt) dt = E
[
u (Mt + dMt) dBt
]
. (9)
Computing the expectation in the right-hand side of (9) using the fact that E [dMtdBt] =
−σ0D[p(M)]dt yields Equation (6). Moreover, combining (9) and (8) leads to:
E [du (Mt)] = ru (Mt) dt,
which, by using Itô's lemma and Equation (6), can be rewritten as (7).
To determine the equilibrium insurance price, note that Equation (6) can be rewritten as follows:
u′(M)
u(M)
= − p(M)
σ0D[p(M)]
.
Diﬀerentiating the above equation yields:
u′′(M)
u(M)
−
[u′(M)
u(M)
]2
= −p′(M)
[ 1
σ0D[p(M)]
− p(M)D
′[p(M)]
σ0D2[p(M)]
]
.
8
Inserting u
′′(M)
u(M) from the above equation into (7) yields
2(r + p2(M)) = p2(M)− σ0p′(M)
(
D[p(M)]− pD′[p(M)]
)
,
which ultimately leads to a ﬁrst-order diﬀerential equation determining the equilibrium price:
p′(M) = − 1
σ0
2r + p2(M)
D[p(M)]− p(M)D′[p(M)] . (10)
Given thatD′(.) < 0, it is immediate to see from the above equation that the price of insurance is
inversely related to the aggregate capacity of the insurance sector. Moreover, applying Itô's lemma
to pt = p(Mt), we can obtain an explicit characterization of the insurance price process. Indeed,
dpt = σ0D[p(Mt)]
(
pt(Mt)p
′(Mt) +
σ0D[p(Mt)]
2
p′′(Mt)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
µ(pt)
dt−σ0D[p(Mt)]p′(Mt)︸ ︷︷ ︸
σ(pt)
dBt. (11)
A simple computation immediately yields the expression of the insurance price volatility:
σ(p) =
2r + p2
1 + ε1(p)
, (12)
where ε1(p) is the elasticity of the demand for insurance:
ε1(p) ≡ −pD
′(p)
D(p)
.
Therefore, Equation (10) can be rewritten as follows:
p′(M) = − σ[p(M)]
σ0D[p(M)]
, (13)
which demonstrates that the changes in the equilibrium insurance price are mainly driven by the
endogenous volatility.
Furthermore, simplifying the expression of the drift of the insurance premium yields:
µ(p) = σ(p)
[
(2r + p2)ε1(p)ε2(p)
2p(1 + ε1(p))2
− pε1(p)
1 + ε1(p)
]
, (14)
where
ε2(p) ≡ −pD
′′(p)
D′(p)
.
To complete the characterization of the competitive equilibrium, let V (M) ≡ Mu(M) denote
the market value of the entire insurance industry. The absence of arbitrage opportunities at the
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(reﬂecting) boundaries M and M implies that
V ′(M) ≡ u(M) +Mu′(M) = 1,
and
V ′(M) ≡ u(M) +Mu′(M) = 1 + γ.
Together with Equations (4) and (5), this respectively implies two conditions: u′(M) = 0 and
M = 0. Inserting u′(M) = 0 into Equation (6), it is easy to see that, when the insurance industry
operates at the maximum level of reserves, the loading factor vanishes, i.e., p ≡ p(M) = 0. Since
p′(M) < 0, this implies that p(M) > 07 for all M > 0 and, therefore, u′(M) < 0 as was conjectured
before. The following proposition summarizes our results.
Proposition 1. There exists a unique stationary Markovian equilibrium, in which aggregate reserves
in the insurance sector evolve according to:
dMt = σ0D[p(Mt)] (p(Mt)dt− dBt) , Mt ∈ (0,M). (15)
The insurance price function p(M) satisﬁes the diﬀerential equation
p′(M) = − σ[p(M)]
σ0D[p(M)]
, (16)
with the boundary condition p(0) = p, where p solves∫ p
0
p
σ(p)
dp = ln(1 + γ). (17)
Proof of Proposition 1: We have already established that any equilibrium price function p(M)
must satisfy the ﬁrst-order diﬀerential Equation (13). Uniqueness of the equilibrium will result
from the Cauchy-Lipschitz theorem, once the boundary value p(0) = p is determined. Once p(M)
is known, function u(M) can be computed by solving
u′(M)
u(M)
= − p(M)
σ0D[p(M)]
,
which yields
u(M) = u(M)exp
(∫ M
M
p(s)
σ0D[p(s)]
ds
)
.
7This property of our model implies that insurance companies always generate non-negative expected proﬁts. In
practice, however, loading factors can be negative, as insurers can hedge their losses via complementary ﬁnancial
market activities.
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Since u(M) = 1 and u(0) = 1 + γ, this implies
∫ M
0
p(s)
σ0D[p(s)]
ds = ln(1 + γ).
Finally, changing the variable of integration in the above equation to p(s) = p yields (17). Q.E.D.
Note that, in the competitive equilibrium, insurance companies recapitalize only when running
out of reserves. At the same time, the target level of aggregate reserves in the insurance industry
can easily be computed according to
M =
∫ p
0
σ0D(p)
σ(p)
dp. (18)
It is immediate to see from Equations (17) and (18) that both the maximum level of insurance
price p and the target level of reserves M increase with the ﬁnancing cost γ. This feature of the
competitive equilibrium emerging in our model suggests that the magnitude of underwriting cycles
observed in practice might be intrinsically related to the magnitude of ﬁnancial frictions faced by
insurance companies.
4. Dynamics of insurance prices
In this section we study the dynamics of the equilibrium price of insurance as predicted by our
model. For convenience, we use the following speciﬁcation of the demand for insurance:
D(p) = (α− p)β,
where β > 0 and α > 0. Parameter α can be interpreted as the price above which demand for
insurance vanishes. Both α and β aﬀect the elasticity of demand for insurance. More precisely, we
have
ε1(p) =
βp
α− p, ε2(p) =
(β − 1)p
α− p .
Inserting ε1(p) and ε2(p) into the general formulas of σ(p) and µ(p), we obtain two simple
expressions that will be further used to illustrate the dynamics of the equilibrium price:
σ(p) =
(α− p) (p2 + 2r)
p(α+ (β − 1)p) , (19)
µ(p) = σ(p)βp
[
(β − 1)(2r − p2)− 2αp
2(α+ (β − 1)p)2
]
. (20)
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4.1. Mean reversion
It is easy to see from Expression (20) that the sign of the insurance price drift is determined by
the sign of the polynomial
h(p) ≡ (β − 1)(2r − p2)− 2αp.
It can be shown that, for α >
√
2r and β > 1, the equation h(p) = 0 has a unique root p∗ on
the interval (0, α) such that µ(p) > 0 on (0, p∗) and µ(p) < 0 on (p∗, α). This implies that the
price process pt exhibits mean reversion. However, it important to note that this mean reversion
property manifests itself only when the ﬁnancing cost γ is suﬃciently high. Indeed, recall that the
maximum level of insurance price, p, is an increasing function of γ with p = 0 when γ = 0. Thus,
when γ is low, p∗ > p and µ(p) > 0 for all p ∈ (0, p).
Moreover, this mean-reversion property is not very strong. Indeed, for most parameter combi-
nations, |µ(p)| turns out to be very small as compared to σ(p) (see the left and the central panels in
Figure 3). The main feature of the dynamics of the price process pt is its reﬂection at the boundaries
of the interval (0, p), which induces what we call price reversals.
4.2. Price reversals
The reﬂection property of the aggregate reserve process in our model induces reversals of the
price of insurance. Empirical work has shown that the insurance market alternates soft market
phases characterized by falling premiums together with an expansion of insurers' capacities and
hard market phases characterized by rising premiums together with a contraction of insurers'
capacities.8
Our model can be used to compute the expected duration of each phase of the underwriting cycle
by using the dynamics of the price of insurance deﬁned in Equation (11). In particular, the expected
duration of the soft market phase (i.e., falling insurance prices) can be measured as the expected
time needed for the process pt to reach 0 while starting from the state p. In a similar fashion, the
expected duration of the hard market phase (i.e., rising insurance prices) can be measured by the
expected time that the process pt needs to reach the state p while starting from 0.
To formalize this, let Ts(p) denote the expected time that the price process pt takes in order to
reach any state p ≤ p starting from the state p and let Th(p) be the expected time it takes to reach
the state p starting from any p ≤ p. We will refer to T s ≡ Ts(0) as the average duration of the soft
market phase and to T h ≡ Th(0) as the average duration of the hard market phase.
Proposition 2. The average duration of the soft market phase can be computed as T s ≡ Ts(0),
where function Ts(p) satisﬁes
1− µ(p)T ′s(p)−
σ2(p)
2
T ′′s (p) = 0, (21)
8A detailed review of the literature on underwriting cycles can be found in Harrington et al.(2013).
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with the boundary conditions Ts(p) = 0 and T
′
s(p) = 0.
The average duration of the hard market phase can be computed as T h ≡ Th(0), where function
Th(p) satisﬁes
1 + µ(p)T ′h(p) +
σ2(p)
2
T ′′h (p) = 0, (22)
with the boundary conditions Th(p) = 0 and T
′
h(0) = 0.
Proof of Proposition 2: To derive the ODE (21), let gp0(p) denote the expected time that is
needed to reach some state p0 starting from any p ≥ p0, where p0 ≤ p ≤ p. Then, Ts(p0) =
Ts(p) + gp0(p) and thus Ts(p) = Ts(p0) − gp0(p). By the Feynman-Kac theorem,9 function gp0(p)
must satisfy the ODE:
1 + µ(p)g′p0(p) +
σ2(p)
2
g′′p0(p) = 0.
Using the fact that g′p0(p) = −T ′s(p) and g′′p0(p) = −T ′′s (p), one obtains ODE (21). The boundary
condition Ts(p) = 0 reﬂects the fact that at p the time to reach p is zero, whereas the boundary
condition T ′s(p) = 0 emerges due to the reﬂection of the price of insurance at p. The same argu-
ments apply to establish the boundary conditions for the function Th(p) to which the Feynman-Kac
theorem applies directly. Q.E.D.
The left-hand side and the central panels of Figure 2 report, respectively, the values of T s and
T h as functions of parameter α for two diﬀerent levels of β. The right-hand side panel of Figure 2
reports the corresponding diﬀerence T s − T h.
These numerical results clearly show that, for parameter combinations implying a higher elas-
ticity of demand for insurance (i.e., higher β and lower α), the cycles emerging in our model
are asymmetric, and the soft market phase tends to be substantially longer than the hard market
phase. A potential explanation for this feature rests on the observation that, in the setting with
an elastic demand for insurance, the endogenous volatility is a monotonically decreasing function of
p. Since the endogenous volatility is lower in the states with higher price of insurance, the system
actually needs more time to make a downward move rather than to make an upward move. For the
parameter combinations implying a highly inelastic demand for insurance, the endogenous volatility
pattern is U -shaped and the diﬀerence between the average durations of the soft and hard market
phases is almost negligible.
4.3. Long-run behavior
To study the dynamics of the price of insurance in the long run, we look at its ergodic density
function that reﬂects the proportion of time that the price process spends in each feasible state in
the long run. Given the price dynamics in (11), the latter can be computed by solving the forward
9See e.g., Shreve (2004), Chapter 6.4.
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Figure 2: Average duration of soft and hard markets
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Kolmogorov equation,10 which ultimately yields:
f(p) =
C0
σ2(p)
exp
(∫ p
0
2µ(s)
σ2(s)
ds
)
, (23)
where the constant C0 is such that
∫ p
0 f(p)dp = 1.
The right panel in Figure 3 depicts the typical pattern of this ergodic density showing that
the latter tends to be concentrated in the states with the low endogenous volatility. This property
of the ergodic density function shows that the negative shocks incurred by insurers may generate
persistence, so that the system can spend quite some time in the states with high insurance prices
and low insurance capacity. As in the recent equilibrium models with ﬁnancial frictions (see e.g.,
Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2014), Klimenko, Pfeil and Rochet (2015)), persistence emerges as
a natural consequence of the capacity adjustments implemented by insurance companies following
proﬁt and losses. In particular, unexpected losses are followed by a reduced scale of operations,
implying that it may take a long time for insurers to restore their capacity.
Figure 3: Drift, volatility and ergodic density of the insurance price
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10See e.g., Ghosh (2010).
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5. Conclusion
This paper presents a general equilibrium version of the classical ruin theory model in continuous
time, as studied for example by Gerber and Shiu (2004). We model a competitive insurance sector
that oﬀers insurance contracts to a population of potential insurees confronted with correlated risks.
There is a unique competitive equilibrium in which prices and capacities are deterministic functions
of the level of aggregate reserves in the insurance sector. The price dynamics can be computed
explicitly. Rather than real cycles, insurance prices are characterized by asymmetric reversals. The
market exhibits alternating periods where premium and proﬁtability rise (hard markets) and fall
(soft markets). The average duration of hard markets is shorter than that of soft markets, provided
that the elasticity of the demand for insurance is not too low.
We also ﬁnd that, even though the insurance premium is (weakly) predictable, there are no
arbitrage opportunities. The reason is that investors cannot directly sell insurance contracts but
can only buy and sell the stocks of insurance companies. The prices of these stocks are discounted
martingales (in between dividend distributions and recapitalizations) but insurance premiums are
not. Similarly, expected proﬁts are positive, despite the perfect competition on the insurance market.
This is because, in the presence of ﬁnancial frictions and even when shareholders are risk neutral,
insurance companies have to be compensated for their exposure to aggregate risks.
A natural extension of our model could allow for the analysis of the implications of regulatory
measures, such as minimum reserve requirements. Another potential avenue of research would be
to consider an alternative model speciﬁcation with Poisson risk, which is better suited for modeling
the catastrophe insurance market. Finally, a interesting line of inquiry would be to test the model
prediction on the asymmetry of underwriting cycles.
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